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Abstract
The law of neutrality and the principle of non-intervention both promulgate
neutrality norms pertaining to third-state assistance for belligerent parties
embroiled in an international or non-international armed conﬂict. This arti-
cle compares and contrasts these two legal frameworks and assesses whether
they work in perfect harmony or, on the contrary, establish different stand-
ards of behaviour depending on the type of armed conﬂict. Additionally, by
approaching both regulatory frameworks simultaneously, conceptual uncer-
tainties hindering their effective application in practice can be clariﬁed. It is
submitted that by adopting such a holistic approach, fresh insights are offered
on the “duty of neutrality”, sensu lato, during armed conﬂicts under interna-
tional law.
I. Introduction
1. While the neutral character of international law in general is subject to debate,1
there are two international legal doctrines that can hardly be accused of challenging it.
First, the body of law that speciﬁes the rights and duties of neutral and belligerent
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States during international armed conﬂicts (IACs)—aptly dubbed the “law of
neutrality”—and, second, the principle of non-intervention that, inter alia, prohibits
third-state intervention during non-international armed conﬂicts (NIACs).
2. It is submitted that both doctrines share a common purpose and core. First,
both aim to maintain peace, friendly relations and a balance of power between
States.2 Second, that aim is achieved by a set of norms limiting the interference by
third States in the internal and external affairs of other States. More speciﬁcally, a
neutral stance is imposed on third States during an IAC by neutrality law, while for-
eign, pro-rebel interventions during a NIAC are prohibited by the non-intervention
principle. Together, they thus form a “legal ﬁrewall” against outside interference dur-
ing armed conﬂicts.
3. This article compares and contrasts both legal frameworks to assess whether the
neutrality norms they promulgate work in perfect harmony or, on the contrary, estab-
lish different standards of behaviour for third-state action depending on the type of
armed conﬂict. Additionally, by approaching both regulatory frameworks simulta-
neously, theoretical uncertainties hindering their effective application in practice can
be clariﬁed. It is submitted that by adopting such a holistic approach, fresh insights
are offered on the “duty of neutrality”, sensu lato, during armed conﬂicts under inter-
national law.
4. To that effect, the article is structured as follows: First, it lays out the current
state of affairs by conducting four case studies on armed conﬂicts that have occurred
in the past ﬁfteen years or are still ongoing (Section II). Second, it (succinctly) revisits
the applicable legal frameworks and highlights some of their conceptual difﬁculties
through the legal evaluation of the aforementioned cases (Section III). Third, it com-
pares and contrasts how international law mandates a neutral stance for third States
during IACs and NIACs based upon the previous two sections. As a result, it provides
a revamped account of these classical legal doctrines (Section IV). Finally, the paper
ends with some tentative observations, while pinpointing the areas in need of addi-
tional research (Section V).
II. Neutrality during armed conﬂicts: a reality check
5. This section provides an overview of four modern examples of armed conﬂicts fea-
turing the interference by non-belligerent parties. The ﬁrst two examples deal with
2 See, generally: Michael Bothe, Neutrality, Concept and General Rules, Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2011), para.4; Declaration on Principles
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2625 (XXV) (1970).
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such interference by “neutral Powers” in support of one of the belligerents of an IAC,
while the ﬁnal two discuss third-state intervention during NIACs.
II.A. The 2003 invasion of Iraq
6. During the invasion of Iraq in 2003, a US-led “coalition of the willing” (without
UNSC authorization) requested various States for assistance, including rights of over-
ﬂight.3 Some States—including Austria and Switzerland—denied such overﬂight of
military aircraft over their territories. While Austria generally referred to its status as a
“neutral State”,4 the Swiss justiﬁcation was more precise. The then Swiss President
Couchepin declared on 20 March 2003 that,
[t]he coalition led by the US has decided to resort to force without the approval
of the UNSC. We are therefore confronted with an armed conﬂict between
states during which the law of neutrality applies [. . .].5
Micheline Calmy, then head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, further
explained that,
[i]f an armed conﬂict breaks out in Iraq without the approval of the UNSC, the
law of neutrality is applicable. In that case, overﬂight for military purposes will
not be authorized, while overﬂight for humanitarian purposes, including the
transport of wounded, will be allowed.6
7. Conversely, a myriad of other States assisted the coalition in various ways. NATO
member Italy, for example, allowed the use of US military bases on Italian soil for
“transit, refueling and maintenance exigencies” and authorized ﬂight over its air
3 It is not the purpose of this article to provide an exhaustive overview of all types of
support provided by third States to the members of the coalition against Iraq. For an
overview of the support provided by European States, see: Hartwig Hummel, A
Survey of Involvement of 15 European States in the Iraq War 2003 (revised ver-
sion), Paks Working Paper 7 (2007), (http://paks.uni-duesseldorf.de/Dokumente/
paks_working_paper_7_rev.pdf).
4 See “Einigkeit in der Ablehnung des Irak-Kriegs”, Parlamentskorrespondenz Nr.
151 vom 26.03.2003, (www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2003/PK0151/).
The Austrian refusal could therefore be based on the Austrian policy position of
neutrality as much as it could be based on neutrality law.
5 Switzerland, 03.200 De´claration du Conseil fe´de´ral concernant la crise en Irak, BO
2003 N 531 (authors’ translation). The President speciﬁed that “transit over land
and overﬂight for military purposes linked to the conﬂict or outside the courant nor-
mal”, as well as “the export of war material destined to the ongoing operations”
would be prohibited. Ibid. (authors’ translation).
6 Switzerland, Nationalrat, Fru¨hjahrsession 2003, 11th session, 17 March 2003,
03.5017 (www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/amtliches-bulletin/amtliches-bulletin-
die-verhandlungen?SubjectId¼5544), (authors’ translation).
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space.7 However, Italy explicitly prohibited the “participation in military actions by
the Italian armed forces”, the “supply and provision of armaments or military vehicles
of any kind” and the “use of military structures [on Italian territory] as a basis for di-
rect attacks on Iraqi targets”.8 As a justiﬁcation for its support to one side of the con-
ﬂict, the Italian Supreme Defence Council attempted to creatively apply neutrality
law by invoking a so-called status of non-belligerency.9
8. In addition, numerous other States offered some type of support for the military
operation, justiﬁed by a general reference to “practice between allies” and/or obliga-
tions under the NATO treaty.10 For instance, France granted overﬂight rights, even
though it had strongly opposed the Iraq invasion before the Security Council.11 The
then French Foreign Affairs Minister, Dominique de Villepin, explained to the
Assemble´e Nationale that “[France] wants the war to be as short and least lethal possi-
ble [and] the countries of the region to abstain from any involvement in the con-
ﬂict.”12 However, he admitted that “some practices between allies exist, which
[France] needs to respect.”13
9. Similarly, although Germany strongly opposed the war,14 it nevertheless pro-
vided overﬂight rights for American and British military aircraft and authorized its
own military to monitor the Turkish-Iraqi border with AWACS aircraft. The
German government justiﬁed this support by reference to the NATO treaty and bi-
lateral agreements with the US.15 However, the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal
Administrative Court) did not agree with that justiﬁcation.16 After referring to
7 See “Communicato del Presidenti Ciampi” on 19 March 2003 (http://presidenti.quir
inale.it/Ciampi/dinamico/ContinuaCiampi.aspx?tipo¼comunicato&key¼21748),
(authors’ translation).
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid. In Section III.A. we argue why we do not think the argument of “non-bellig-
erency” sufﬁces as a justiﬁcation for neutrality law violations.
10 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, 34 UNTS 243.
11 SC Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.4704 (14 February 2003), 11-13/32.
12 France, Assemble´e nationale, De´bats parlementaires, Journal ofﬁcial de la
Re´publique franc¸aise du mercredi 26 Mars 2003, Compte Rendu integral, 2e se´ance
du mardi 25 mars 2003, question by M. Jean-Pierre Brard and answer by M.
Dominique de Villepin (authors’ translation).
13 Ibid.
14 SC Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.4701 (5 February 2003), 36-37/39.
15 Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, Stenograﬁscher Bericht, Plenarprotokoll 15/34,
15. Wahlperiode – 34. Sitzung. Berlin, Mittwoch, 19 March 2003, 2728.
16 Bundesverwaltungsgericht, Urteil vom 21.06.2005 – 2 WD 12.04.
[ECLI:DE:BVerwG:2005:210605U2WD12.04.0], (authors’ translation for this
and all the following quotes from this judgment).
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various provisions of neutrality law,17 the Court ruled that Germany “was not freed
from these obligations under international law by being [. . .] a member of
NATO”.18 The Court speciﬁed that the obligations certainly included a prohibition
on granting “cross-border rights for US and UK military aircraft” and the “admission
of troops, the transport of weapons and military supplies from German soil to the war
zone”.19 Since the “purpose of these measures was to facilitate or even to promote the
military action of the USA and the UK”, the Court held that the supportive measures
raised “serious concerns” in light of Hague Convention V.20
10. For two other types of support, namely the deployment of AWACS ﬂights
over Turkey and the role of German soldiers in protecting US barracks on German
territory, the Court’s analysis was more measured. With regard to the former, the
compliance with neutrality law “[depended] on whether the data obtained during
these operations were of importance for the war operations in Iraq and whether the
US and UK forces had de facto access to them”, whereas for the latter it depended on
whether these tasks were taken over from US soldiers “in order to enable or facilitate
the withdrawal of the respective troops into the war zone”.21 If that were the case,
these supportive acts would also not be compatible with the prohibition under neu-
trality law of supporting a belligerent party.22
11. In addition, Ireland offered similar support by allowing US aircraft to use the
Shannon airport for stop-overs on their way to Iraq. During the parliamentary de-
bate, the government contended it did “not regard the provision of landing and
overﬂight facilities to foreign aircraft as participating in a war”.23 More speciﬁcally,
it argued that “the provision of facilities does not make Ireland a member of a mili-
tary coalition nor does anybody regard us as such. [Ireland] remains militarily
neutral.”24 However, and again similar to the German example, the Irish High
Court later ruled that,
there is an identiﬁable rule of customary law in relation to the status of neutral-
ity where under a neutral state may not permit the movement of large numbers
17 Ibid., para.4.1.4.1.2 which cites Hague Convention V, arts. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 11 and
Hague Convention XIII, arts. 2, 9 and 24. For a discussion of neutral duties, see be-
low Section III.A.
18 Ibid., para.4.1.4.1.3.
19 Ibid., para.4.1.4.1.4.
20 In addition, the support caused the same “serious concerns” in light of the prohibi-
tion on the use of force. Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 See Ireland, Foreign Conﬂicts: Motion, 563 Da´il E´ireann Debate (20 March 2003).
24 Ibid.
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of troops or munitions of one belligerent State through its territory en route to a
theatre of war with another.25
12. Finally, Kuwait allowed its territory to be used as a basis for coalition attacks
against neighbouring Iraq to which the latter responded by launching missiles against
the former.26 Saudi Arabia declared that it “[would] not participate in any way” in
the war against Iraq, but nevertheless allowed the US to make use of its Prince Sultan
Air Base.27 No evidence was found of similar retaliating military action by Iraq
against Saudi Arabia or any of the European States offering support to the coalition.
13. In sum, the 2003 invasion of Iraq features multiple examples of third-state sup-
port to one side of the IAC as well as some refusals thereof. States that provided assis-
tance in violation of neutrality law justiﬁed their actions by reference to “practices
between (NATO) allies” (France, Germany, Ireland) or by arguing that an intermedi-
ate status of non-belligerency exists (Italy). Some other States refused to provide any
type of assistance, thereby explicitly referring to their neutral obligations or their (po-
litically) neutral position. Nevertheless, at least two of the assisting States were later
confronted with domestic judgments indicating (ex post facto) violations of neutral
duties (Germany and Ireland). On one occasion, the assisting third State (Kuwait)
was even the victim of armed reprisals by the aggrieved belligerent. In addition, there
were clear examples of neutrality law violations that have remained without judicial
or military consequences. Importantly, however, none of the assisting States overtly
set aside neutrality law or denied its application.
II.B. The 2008 Russo-Georgian War
14. During the IAC between Russia and Georgia in 2008—again without UNSC au-
thorization28—far fewer outspoken violations of neutrality law occurred. The short
25 Ireland, High Court of Ireland, Horgan v An Taoiseach & Ors [2003] IEHC 64
(IEHC (2003)), 28 April 2003, para.125. The Court nevertheless decided that it
could not pronounce on an issue it considered to fall within the discretion of Irish
governmental policy. Ibid., para.173.
26 Iraq Launches Scud missiles, The Guardian, 20 March 2003 (www.theguardian.-
com/world/2003/mar/20/iraq6); Missile Hits Kuwait City Mall, CNN, 29 March
2003 (http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/28/sprj.irq.war.main/).
No Iraqi statements referring to the law of neutrality were found.
27 Even though this base had a crucial role during the Iraq invasion, it is unclear
whether or not Saudi Arabia allowed the US to launch attacks against Iraq from it.
See Craig S. Smith, Threats and Responses: A Command Post. Reluctant Saudi
Arabia Prepares its Quiet Role in the U.S.-led War on Iraq, The New York Times,
20 March 2003 (www.nytimes.com/2003/03/20/world/threats-responses-com-
mand-post-reluctant-saudi-arabia-prepares-its-quiet-role-us.html).
28 War with Russia over South Ossetia, Keesing’s World News Archive (Keesing’s)
(2008), 48740.
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but intense hostilities between Russia and Georgia started on 7 August and ended
with an EU-brokered ceaseﬁre on 16 August.29 Even though the actions by Russia
were condemned by numerous countries, including Russia’s fellow members of the
G8,30 and even though those countries asserted their “strong and continued support
for Georgia’s sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders”,31 none of
them openly provided military support to Georgia (or Russia, for that matter) during
the conﬂict.32
15. However, assistance by the US qualiﬁed as the lone exception in this context.
On 8 August 2008, the US delivered “disaster packages” which included “basic medi-
cal supplies, tents, blankets, bedding, hygiene items, clothing, beds and cots”, whereas
on 10 August $250,000 were provided for the “procurement and distribution of
emergency relief supplies”.33 Moreover, and more conspicuously, the US airlifted the
Georgian troops who were operating in Iraq back to Georgia.34 As this happened on
10 and 11 August, while the conﬂict was still ongoing, it could be regarded as a viola-
tion of neutral duties by the US. Nonetheless, the law of neutrality was neither in-
voked by third States as a justiﬁcation for the general abstention in providing support
to the “victim of aggression” (Georgia), nor used by Russia to condemn the (possible)
illegality of the limited US action.35
29 Georgia and Russia Declare Ceaseﬁre, The Guardian, 16 August 2008, (www.the-
guardian.com/world/2008/aug/16/georgia.russia2).
30 See Joint Statement on Georgia by Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the United Stated and the United Kingdom, Released on 27 August
2008 (https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/aug/108941.htm).
31 Ibid.
32 While this could partially be explained because of the short period the conﬂict
lasted, the reluctance by third—and certainly European—States to actively support
Georgia can also be explained by the EU’s dependency on energy pipelines crossing
Russian territory. See, for instance: US, Ofﬁce of the Vice President, Background
Brieﬁng by Senior Administration Ofﬁcial on the Vice President’s Trip to
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Italy, 28 August 2008 (https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/08/20080828-9.html).
33 US, The White House, Setting the Record Straight: President Bush Has Taken
Action to Ensure Peace, Security and Humanitarian Aid in Georgia, Ofﬁce of the
Press Secretary, 13 August 2008 (https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
news/releases/2008/08/20080813-2.html). A few months after the conﬂict, Russian
Prime Minister Putin also accused Ukraine for having delivered weaponry to
Georgia and even for having assisted with the operation of those weapons. See Putin
accuses Ukraine of having assisted Georgia during war, NY Times, 2 October 2008
(www.nytimes.com/2008/10/02/world/europe/02iht-ukraine.5.16655766.html).
34 US, Setting the Record Straight, above n.33.
35 However, during the UNSC meeting of 8 August, one day after the conﬂict
erupted, Georgia accused Russia of not abiding by its “obligation to remain neutral”
vis-a`-vis the relationship between Georgia and South Ossetia. See SC Verbatim
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16. In conclusion, the Russo-Georgian war did not witness as many examples of
third-state assistance in violation of the law of neutrality as was the case for the Iraq
invasion. While most States abstained from assisting either side of the conﬂict, the
US did provide aid but stressed it was of a purely humanitarian nature. The US also
airlifted Georgian soldiers home from Iraq, without pronouncing on the legality of
that action under neutrality law, whereas Russia did not invoke any violation of neu-
trality law, nor did it adopt any type of retaliatory action.
II.C. The Syrian Civil War
17. The Syrian Civil War provides abundant examples of third-state assistance to
both sides of the non-international armed conﬂict pitting the ruling regime led by
President Bashar al-Assad against multiple armed opposition groups.36 A variety of
“terrorist” (as opposed to “rebel” or “opposition”) groups are moreover involved,37
adding a dimension to the conﬂict with signiﬁcant legal relevance. However, the case-
study is narrowed by looking in particular at the aid provided by the US and (mem-
bers of the) EU to the Syrian armed opposition.38 This particular focus is justiﬁed be-
cause the principle of non-intervention arguably does not apply in the context of
third-state assistance upon request by the internationally legitimate government,
without thereby arguing that such assistance is necessarily lawful under international
law. Consequently, third-state support to the Syrian armed forces will not further be
discussed here.39
Record, UN Doc. S/PV.5951 (8 August 2008), 4/9. As Georgia does not consider
South Ossetia to be an independent State, this statement can hardly be interpreted
as a reference to neutrality law (which only applies when armed conﬂicts between
States occur).
36 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) concluded in July 2012
that a non-international armed conﬂict was occurring in Syria. See: Syria: ICRC and
Syrian Arab Red Crescent Maintain Aid Effort amid Increased Fighting, ICRC, 17
July 2012 (www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/2012/syria-update-
2012-07-17.htm).
37 This is a highly controversial distinction. The approach of this article relies upon the
lists maintained by the US and the EU. See: US, State Department, Foreign
Terrorist Organizations (www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm) and
Council of the EU, EU Terrorist List, (www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/ﬁght-
against-terrorism/terrorist-list/).
38 See below Section III.B.
39 But see: Melanie De Groof, Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la
Se´curite´ (GRIP), Arms Transfers to the Syrian Arab Republic: Practice and Legality
(15 November 2013) (www.grip.org/fr/node/1132), 35-8.
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18. During the course of the Syrian civil war, the US has come out as one of the
staunchest supporters of the anti-Government armed forces.40 It has openly boasted
about spending more than $6.5 billion on humanitarian assistance since the start of
the conﬂict,41 as well as providing “vetted” members of the armed opposition forces
with so-called non-lethal assistance.42 The latter type encompassed “transition assis-
tance” to create the conditions for an eventual political transition (including civil ad-
ministration training programs and critical equipment) and “direct non-lethal
assistance” to help defend against attacks by the regime and violent extremist groups
(including food baskets, medical supplies, communications equipment, vehicles and
other basic supplies).43 In addition, there were regular reports of US lethal aid to se-
lect opposition groups.44 However, at least some action to that effect was taken under
“covert action authorities”,45 which intended to obfuscate the role of the US govern-
ment.46 It appears that US ofﬁcials have indeed avoided openly admitting to provid-
ing such support to date, though there are some (notable) exceptions.47
19. Moreover, the National Defense Authorization Act 2015 (NDAA) authorized
the US State and Defense Departments to provide “assistance [. . .] and sustainment,
to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition”, for the purpose of, inter
alia, “securing territory controlled by the Syrian opposition” and “[p]romoting the
40 See, generally: Tom Ruys, Of Arms, Funding, and “Non-lethal Assistance” – Issues
Surrounding Third-State Intervention in the Syrian Civil War, 13 Chinese JIL
(2014), 13, and Christian Henderson, The Provision of Arms and “Non-Lethal”
Assistance to Governmental and Opposition Forces, 36 University of New South
Wales LJ (2013), 642, 659-64.
41 US, State Department, U.S. Humanitarian Assistance in Response to the Syrian
Crisis (5 April 2017), (www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2017/269469.htm).
This support did not only beneﬁt members of the armed opposition, but was rather
aimed at providing “lifesaving support to the people of Syria wherever they are”.
42 US, Congress, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (18 December 2015), P.L.
114-113 (www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2029/text), Sec. 7041
(h) Syria.
43 US, State Department, Syrian Crisis: U.S. Efforts and Assistance (7 August 2015),
(https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/08/245807.htm).
44 Carla E. Humud, Christopher M. Blanchard and Mary Beth D. Nikitin,
Congressional Research Service, Armed Conﬂict in Syria: Overview and U.S.
Response (26 April 2017), (https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf), n.110.
45 Ibid., at 30. See also: Karen DeYoung, Congressional Panels Approve Arms Aid to
Syrian Opposition, The Washington Post, 22 July 2013 (www.washingtonpost.-
com/world/national-security/congressional-panels-approve-arms-aid-to-syrian-op-
position/2013/07/22/393035ce-f31a-11e2-8505-
bf6f231e77b4_story.html?utm_term¼.48f298872656).
46 US, Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms (February 2017), (www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did¼799027).
47 See Humud, Blanchard and Nikitin, above n.44, 30-31.
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conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conﬂict in Syria”.48 The joint ex-
planatory statement adds that “sustainment [. . .] includes the provision of [. . .] arms,
munitions, and equipment”.49 This legislation, part of the so-called Syrian Train and
Equip Program, thus—at least in theory—allows the provision of lethal aid, including
for the beneﬁt of the Syrian armed opposition groups in their armed resistance to the
Assad regime. However, it seems that—in practice—the program was (and remains)
fundamentally geared towards the ﬁght against the Islamic State.50 Indeed, although
the NDAA 2017 extended the authorization for the Syria training programme
through 31 December 2018, it also transferred the funds for the former Syria and
Iraq “Train and Equip Funds” to a new “Counter-ISIL Fund”.51
20. Turning to European practice, more than e9.4 billion has been spent by the
EU on humanitarian aid.52 Conversely, the Council of the EU implemented an arms
embargo on Syria on 9 May 2011.53 However, an exception was made for “non-lethal
military equipment” and “equipment which might be used for internal repression” if
“intended solely for humanitarian or protective use”.54 The embargo was eased signif-
icantly in February 2013,55 and ﬁnally lifted for the beneﬁt of the Syrian National
Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces in May of the same year.56
However, the EU Foreign Affairs Council (again) noted that member States had com-
mitted themselves to exclusively consider arms deliveries for the purpose of protecting
civilians and abide by the EU Council Common Position 2008/944 on exports of
48 US, Congress, Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (19 December 2014) P.L. 113-291,
(www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3979), Section 1209(a).
49 See Legislative Text and Joint Explanatory Statement, Accompanying the Enrolled
Version of H.R.3979, above n.48, 870.
50 Christopher M. Blanchard and Carla E. Humud, Congressional Research Service,
The Islamic State and U.S. Policy (2 February 2017), (https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mid
east/R43612.pdf), 11-12.
51 See: US Congress, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (23
December 2016) P.L. 114-328, (www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/
2943), Sec. 1212 and 4302 Line 10.
52 European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, Syrian Crisis (May
2017), (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/ﬁles/aid/countries/factsheets/syria_en.pdf).
53 EU Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP (9 May 2011), OJ 2011 L 121/11 and
Council Regulation 442/2011 (9 May 2011), OJ 2011 L 121/1.
54 EU Council Decision, above n.53, art. 2(1)(b).
55 EU Council Decision 2013/109/CFSP (28 February 2013), OJ 2013 L 58/8.
56 EU, Foreign Affairs – Council, Council Declaration on Syria (27 May 2013),
(www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/
137315.pdf) (emphasis added). See also: Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP (31
May 2013), OJ 2013 L 147/14.
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military technology and equipment.57 That Council Common Position does not ex-
plicitly prohibit transferring arms to non-state armed groups embroiled in civil war,
but does prescribe that an export license shall be denied if it would be inconsistent
with member States’ international obligations or would prolong armed conﬂicts in
the country of ﬁnal destination.58 However, lifting an arms embargo does not (neces-
sarily) imply that arms transfers are lawful. For example, the Dutch Government
maintained that, although there was no international obligation to impose an arms
embargo on Syria, the non-intervention principle still applied and included a prohibi-
tion on “supporting the armed opposition through the provision of military material
and training”.59
21. In any event, no EU member State seems to have overtly admitted sending war
material to the Syrian armed opposition.60 While the UK confessed to having pro-
vided more than £67 million to the Syrian opposition, most of those funds have (ofﬁ-
cially) been allocated to rather innocuous support.61 Even sending life-saving
equipment to the moderate armed opposition—including communications, medical
and logistics equipment, as well as equipment to protect against chemical weapons
attacks—does not immediately raise any red ﬂags. In a similar sense, then French
President Franc¸ois Hollande hinted at having provided arms to the Syrian rebels,
but maintained that the support was in accordance with European commitments.62
57 Moreover, the declaration stipulated that “Member States will not proceed at this
stage with the delivery of the equipment mentioned above”. Ibid.
58 Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (8 December 2008), OJ 2008 L 335/
99, art. 2(1) and (3). See also the User’s Guide to Council Common Position 2008/
944/CFSP deﬁning common rules governing the control of exports of military tech-
nology and equipment (29 April 2009), (http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/
srv?l¼EN&f¼ST%209241%202009%20INIT).
59 The Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kamerbrief over de Volkenrechtelijke
Aspecten van het Sanctieregime tegen Syrie¨ (4 April 2013), (www.rijksoverheid.nl/
documenten/brieven/2013/06/04/brief-volkenrechtelijke-aspecten-van-het-sanctier-
egime-tegen-syrie), 2 (authors’ translation).
60 De Groof, above n.39, 41. According to data by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, no State ofﬁcially sent “major conventional weapons” to the
Syrian rebels. Its Arms Transfers Database only shows “missile” deliveries in 2012,
2013 and 2014 by unknown suppliers. See: (www.sipri.org/databases/
armstransfers).
61 United Kingdom, Foreign & Commonwealth Ofﬁce, Factsheet: The UK’s Non-
humanitarian Aid Response to the Syrian Crisis (last updated on 1 December 2015)
(www.gov.uk/government/statistics/factsheet-the-uks-non-humanitarian-aid-response-
to-the-syria-crisis–2).
62 Christophe Ayad, David Revault d’Allonnes and Thomas Wieder, Hollande au
« Monde »: « Les Rebelles Syriens Me´ritent Tout Notre Soutien », Le Monde, 20
August 2014 (www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2014/08/20/hollande-au-monde-
je-veux-accelerer-les-reformes_4473704_823448.html).
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The French Foreign Affairs Ministry website furthermore merely mentions that
France supports moderate groups in Syria ﬁghting the so-called Islamic State.63
Additionally, a team of investigative reporters laid bare a e1.2 billion weapons pipe-
line from Central and Eastern European States to States considered to be key backers
of the Syrian opposition in July 2016.64 However, the exporting States seemed to
rely on assurances provided by the beneﬁciaries that the arms would not be resold or
exported.65
22. Finally, in support of their decision not to export weapons to Syria, several
European States expressed the view that the supply of arms to the Syrian opposition
would (likely) be in breach of the customary principle of non-intervention and thus
illegal under international law.66
23. Looking at this practice, two elements stand out. First, the US and EU mem-
ber States did not seem to have any qualms about admitting their support for orga-
nized armed groups in Syria, as long as it pertained to humanitarian aid.67 Second,
although the necessary authorization was adopted in the US and the EU arms em-
bargo on Syria was eventually (partially) lifted, no State openly admitted to providing
(lethal or non-lethal) military aid to the Syrian armed opposition directed towards its
ﬁght against the Assad regime. If assistance for military purposes was in fact (grudg-
ingly) acknowledged, the “anti-terrorist” features thereof were highlighted where
possible.68
24. Furthermore, the Syrian government reacted furiously to the involvement of
third States, evidenced by its numerous letters to the UNSC on the topic.69 This
63 France, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, La France et la Syrie (last updated in February
2017), (www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/syrie/la-france-et-la-syrie/).
64 See the Balkan Arms Trade—Making a Killing Project by the Balkan Investigative
Reporting Network (BIRN) and Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting
Project (OCCRP) (www.balkaninsight.com/en/page/balkan-arms-trade) and
(www.occrp.org/en/makingakilling/).
65 Ivan Angelovski, Miranda Patrucic and Lawrence Marzouk, Revealed: The £1bn of
Weapons Flowing from Europe to Middle East, The Guardian, 27 July 2016
(www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/27/weapons-ﬂowing-eastern-europe-mid-
dle-east-revealed-arms-trade-syria).
66 See Julian Borger, The Austrian Position on Arms Embargo in Syria—Ofﬁcial
Document, The Guardian, 15 May 2013 (www.theguardian.com/world/julian-
borger-global-security-blog/interactive/2013/may/15/austria-eu-syria-arms-em-
bargo-pdf); The Netherlands, Kamerbrief Sanctieregime Syrie¨, above n.59.
67 Ruys, above n.40, paras.56-62.
68 See, e.g., above nn.50-51 and 63.
69 See, for an overview of Syrian letters in the ﬁrst half of 2015 alone: Tom Ruys, Nele
Verlinden and Luca Ferro, “Digest of State Practice 1 January–30 June 2015”, 2
Journal on the Use of Force and International Law (2015), n.216.
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point of view was echoed by Russian and Iranian ofﬁcials, as the Assad regime’s main
patrons, though admittedly couched in more general terms.70
II.D. The War in Donbas (Eastern Ukraine)
25. Following the fall of the Ukrainian government in February71 and the secession
of Crimea in March 2014 (later absorbed by the Russian Federation),72 increasingly
heavy armed clashes erupted in the eastern Ukrainian regions Donetsk and Luhansk
(together referred to as the “Donbas”) between Ukrainian governmental forces and
pro-Russian separatists.73 By 23 July 2014, the International Committee of the Red
Cross labelled the situation in eastern Ukraine a NIAC74—with no clear end in
sight.75
26. From the outset of the conﬂict, allegations of Russian involvement were ubiq-
uitous. Already on 13 April 2014, the US State Department presented the (circum-
stantial) evidence of Russian pro-separatist support, leading to their assessment that
Russia attempted to “undermine Ukrainian sovereignty [. . .] in contravention of [its]
obligations under international law.”76 Four months later, then NATO Secretary-
General Anders Rasmussen condemned the use of Russian forces in Ukraine as well
as “Russian artillery support” and “transfers of large quantities of advanced weapons,
including tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and artillery to separatist groups in
Eastern Ukraine”.77 In November 2014, the EU High Representative for Foreign
70 See, e.g., SC Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.7621 (15 February 2016), 28
(Russian Federation); Iran Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zarif: No Pre-condition for
Iran Presence in Intl Forums Acceptable (29 October 2015), (http://en.mfa.ir/in
dex.aspx?fkeyid¼&siteid¼3&pageid¼2027&newsview¼364666).
71 Election of President—Unrest in Eastern Ukraine, 60 Keesing’s (2014), 53378.
72 Annexation of Crimea, 60 Keesing’s (2014), 53241; Loss of Crimea to Russia, 60
Keesing’s (2014), 53242.
73 Separatist Unrest in Eastern Ukraine, 60 Keesing’s (2014), 53301.
74 Ukraine: ICRC Calls on All Sides to Respect International Humanitarian Law,
ICRC, 23 July 2014 (www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2014/
07-23-ukraine-kiev-call-respect-ihl-repatriate-bodies-malaysian-airlines.htm).
75 See, the biannual Digests of State Practice in the Journal on the Use of Force and
International Law (e.g., above n.69) for a regular update of the conﬂict.
76 US, State Department, Evidence of Russian Support for Destabilization of Ukraine
(13 April 2014), (https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/04/224762.htm).
For States sharing that assessment, see: SC Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.7154
(13 April 2014); SC Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.7157 (16 April 2014); SC
Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.7165 (29 April 2014); SC Verbatim Record, UN
Doc. S/PV.7167 (2 May 2014); SC Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.7205 (24
June 2014).
77 NATO, NATO Secretary General Condemns Entry of Russian Convoy into
Ukraine (22 August 2014), (www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112112.htm).
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Affairs, Federica Mogherini, further called on Russia to prevent “movement of mili-
tary, weapons or ﬁghters from its territory into Ukraine” and withdraw “any troops,
weapons and equipment under its control”.78
27. More generally, the International Crisis Group reported that “while publicly
sticking to the line that Moscow’s [. . .] inﬂuence [. . .] is minimal, [Donetsk separat-
ist] leaders privately admit their total dependence”.79 Still according to the report, the
“armed groups’ dependence on Russia for weapons, equipment, clothing and military
support has acted as a strong deterrent against challenging the Moscow line”.80
Presumably, it was allegations of this kind that led the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) to examine whether Russia exercised “overall control over
armed groups in eastern Ukraine”.81
28. The Russian reaction to such allegations was either evasive or in full denial.82
In August 2014, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs denounced the “hysteria in some capi-
tals after Russia sent humanitarian aid to the suffering population”,83 leading to “false
claims of Russian aggression and incursions by our troops and armoured vehicles”.84
Furthermore, in September 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin broadly stated:
“I believe that providing aid to illegitimate organizations is not in line with interna-
tional law and the charter of the United Nations. We support only legitimate
78 European Union External Action, Statement by High Representative/Vice-
President Federica Mogherini on the Latest Developments in Ukraine (9 November
2014), (https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/6824/state
ment-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-latest-developments-
ukraine_en).
79 International Crisis Group, Russia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine (5
February 2016), 7, (www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/
ukraine/russia-and-separatists-eastern-ukraine).
80 Ibid., 6.
81 ICC, The Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities
2016 (14 November 2016), para.170 (www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-
rep-PE_ENG.pdf). With this quote, we do not intend to open the debate on the
possible internationalization of the conﬂict. It merely illustrates the widespread alle-
gations of Russian military support to the Ukrainian rebels.
82 See the interventions by the Russian representative during UNSC debates, above
n.76. See also above n.75.
83 Russia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comment by the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs regarding Claims Addressed to Us regarding the “Legal Framework” of
Sending Humanitarian Aid to Lugansk (23 August 2014), (www.mid.ru/en/for-
eign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/673357).
84 Russia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on the Events in Ukraine (29 August 2014), (www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/
maps/ua/-/asset_publisher/ktn0ZLTvbbS3/content/id/672727).
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government organizations.”85 On 16 November 2016, two days after the damaging
ICC report,86 President Putin signed a decree dedicated to the intention not to be-
come a party to the Court.87 Maria Zakharova, the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson,
explained that the report’s depiction of the situation in southeast Ukraine was
“biased” and lambasted its sources.88 Finally, after an international investigation con-
cluded that the MH17 ﬂight was downed by a missile launcher brought into Ukraine
from Russia,89 Zakharova again called the allegations “groundless and
unsubstantiated”, while pointing at the investigation’s “poor quality”.90
29. On two separate occasions, however, President Putin came close to admitting
Russian involvement. First, on 17 December 2015, he stated during his annual press
conference that: “We’ve never said there are no people there who deal with certain mat-
ters, including in the military area, but this does not mean that regular Russian troops
are present there.”91 Second, on 12 October 2016, he admitted Russia “had—to reit-
erate, had—to defend the Russian-speaking population in Donbass”.92 Regardless of
these statements, no direct admissions of involvement have surfaced to date.
30. In sum, and similar to the Syrian case study, Russian ofﬁcials were upfront
about their intentions to support the population in eastern Ukraine by providing hu-
manitarian assistance. However, they have not (publicly) accepted responsibility for
additional Russian interference. This included downplaying Russian-made equip-
ment being used by the separatist forces, as well as the relationship between Russian
citizens active in the conﬂict and their ties to the Russian State.
85 Charlie Rose, Transcript of President Vladimir Putin, Pt. 1 (28 September 2015),
(https://charlierose.com/videos/22696). The quote is a reply to a question on the sit-
uation in Syria. However, the situation in southeast Ukraine was also discussed.
86 See above n.81.
87 Russia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry (16
November 2016), (www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonk
JE02Bw/content/id/2523566).
88 Russia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brieﬁng by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Maria Zakharova, Moscow (17 November 2016), (www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/
news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2529854).
89 Sterling and Deutsch, Malaysian Flight MH17 Downed by Russian-made Missile:
Prosecutors, Reuters, 28 September 2016 (www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-cri-
sis-mh-idUSKCN11Y0WN).
90 Russia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brieﬁng by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Maria Zakharova Moscow (29 September 2016), (www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/
news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2479008#10).
91 Russia, Kremlin, Vladimir Putin’s Annual News Conference (17 December 2015),
(http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50971) (emphasis added).
92 Russia, Kremlin, Russia Calling! Investment Forum (12 October 2016), (http://en.
kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53077) (emphasis added).
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III. Revisiting the applicable legal frameworks
31. Following an overview of recent and ongoing armed conﬂicts, and the interfer-
ence therein by non-belligerent parties, the following section is dedicated to the evalu-
ation of such practice on the basis of the applicable legal frameworks, i.e., the law of
neutrality (for IACs) and the principle of non-intervention (for NIACs).
Concomitantly, some of their conceptual difﬁculties are highlighted and clariﬁed.
III.A. The law of neutrality
32. The law of neutrality is an old body of law which aims at preventing third States
from becoming involved in a war. It applies solely in situations of international armed
conﬂict. The main instruments of neutrality law date back to 1907 and are still in
force today: Hague Convention V on Neutral Powers in Case of War on Land and
Hague Convention XIII on Neutral Powers in Naval War.93 More recent legal provi-
sions have been included in the 1949 Geneva Conventions94 and the 1977 First
Additional Protocol,95 as well as in non-binding instruments.96
33. The basic rules of neutrality law all derive from the principles of impartiality,
abstention and prevention, and include rights and duties for both neutral and bellig-
erent States. Neutral States are prohibited from participating in the hostilities and
providing assistance to the belligerent parties, while being bound by a duty of impar-
tiality. More speciﬁcally, a neutral State may not allow the use of its territory by one
of the belligerents, including allowing overﬂights or stopovers for military planes or
the installation or use of “wireless telegraph stations”.97
93 1907 Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
and Persons in Case of War on Land and 1907 Hague Convention (XIII)
Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, both available
in the ICRC IHL Treaty Database (https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl) that further
includes the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols).
94 E.g., GC II, art. 5 and GC IV, art. 4.
95 E.g., AP II, arts. 2 and 19.
96 International Law Association, Helsinki Principles on the Law of Maritime
Neutrality, Final Report of the Committee on Maritime Neutrality, Report of the
68th Conference (1998), 496; Louise Doswald-Beck (ed.), San Remo Manual on
International Law Applicable to Armed Conﬂicts at Sea (1995), (San Remo
Manual).
97 See Hague Rules on Air Warfare, December 1922 – February 1923 (available at
http://lawofwar.org/hague_rules_of_air_warfare.htm), art. 40; HPCR Manual on
International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, published by Cambridge
University Press, New York, 2013 (AMW Manual), rules 166 and 167(a) and San
Remo Manual, para.14. For a modern application of this rule in relation to cyber,
see Tallinn Manual 2.0, Rule 151 and its commentary: Michael N. Schmitt and
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (eds.), Tallinn Manual
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34. As such, and looking at the State practice discussed above,98 granting overﬂight
rights indeed forms a violation of the law of neutrality. The only exception would be
allowing overﬂight for humanitarian purposes, as the example of Switzerland during
the Iraq war correctly indicates. While the Irish government was perhaps right in say-
ing that allowing US planes to land at Shannon airport does not equal an Irish
“participation in the war”, such supportive actions nevertheless violated the law of
neutrality.
35. The corollary of these neutral duties is the neutral State’s right to have its terri-
tory respected by the belligerents, meaning that combatants may not enter that terri-
tory (Article 1 HC V) and that belligerents may not recruit troops on the territory of
a neutral State (Article 4 HC V). If a combatant enters the territory of a neutral State,
that State has the duty to capture and intern him (Articles 11 and 12 HC V). Thus, if
a third State allows a military base to be used by a belligerent on the neutral territory,
as Italy did during the 2003 Iraq war, it violates the law of neutrality.
36. Furthermore, neutrality law clearly prohibits the provision of war material by
neutral States to belligerents (Art. 6 HC XIII).99 Even though it does not contain spe-
ciﬁc norms related to the provision of other types of support, the prohibition of assis-
tance is considered to include also ﬁnancial aid, such as gifts and loans,100 or the
provision of services that could inﬂuence the outcome of the conﬂict, such as intelli-
gence sharing.101 As helping troops to return from a different battleﬁeld to ﬁght in a
newly erupted IAC arguably inﬂuences the outcome of that IAC, the US assistance in
airlifting Georgian troops from Iraq to Georgia in 2008 constituted a violation of
neutrality law. Nevertheless, this observation does not exclude the fact that under the
rules of jus ad bellum, as enshrined in the UN Charter, States are entitled to assist a
victim of aggression in collective self-defence.
2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (2017), 556. Note
that the rule is different in case of passage through territorial waters, see HC XIII,
art. 10.
98 Above n.16.
99 However, neutrality law does not impose a duty on neutral States to prevent sup-
plies by individuals (HC V, art. 7 and HC XIII, art. 7). This rule is nowadays con-
sidered to be outdated, as most scholars accept a prevention duty on the side of the
neutral State. See authors quoted in Yves Sandoz, “Rights, Powers and Obligations
of Neutral Powers under the Conventions” in Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta and
Marco Sasso`li (eds.), The 1949 Geneva Conventions: a Commentary (2015), 90.
100 Hersch Lauterpacht, 2 Oppenheim’s International Law: A Treatise (1955), 2,
para.352.
101 Eric Castre´n, The Present Law of War and Neutrality, 85 Annales Academiae
Scientiarum Fennicae (1954), 474. Castre´n further notes that “[it] would seem that
it sufﬁces for a State to refrain from delivering to belligerents material which has, ex-
clusively or at least mainly, a military purpose”.
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37. An important and undisputed exception to the foregoing is the provision of
humanitarian aid, which falls outside the scope of the prohibition of assistance (Art.
14 HC V). It is, perhaps, no coincidence that the US stressed it was only providing
humanitarian aid to Georgia during the IAC with Russia. The law of neutrality also
does not prohibit States from maintaining trade relations with belligerents, as long as
it does so in an impartial way (Art. 9 HC V). Restrictions on trade between neutral
and belligerent States may however ﬂow from other obligations, such as UNSC
Resolutions.
38. The combination of both neutral rights and duties forms a source of uncer-
tainty and discontent with regard to neutrality law. Indeed, States have occasionally
expressed the desire to enjoy neutral rights without having to comply with the full
range of neutral duties. Hence, such a stance would bring States in a grey zone be-
tween being neutral and being belligerent, which has been labelled by scholars as
“qualiﬁed neutrality”,102 “differentiated neutrality”, “benevolent neutrality” or “non-
belligerency”.103
39. The notion of non-belligerency was introduced by Italy in 1939, when it ini-
tially decided not to take part in the Second World War but nevertheless supported
Germany.104 The US also claimed to be a non-belligerent during the Second World
War before entering the war.105 Non-belligerent States willingly abandon their duty
of impartiality and non-assistance, respecting only the duty of non-participation in
the hostilities.106 In doing so, they hope to keep the protection offered to neutrals,107
while still choosing a side in the conﬂict and inﬂuencing its outcome. Together with
some States, some scholars have defended non-belligerency as a legal intermediate
status.108
102 Lauterpacht, above n.100, 648.
103 Maurice Torrelli, La Neutralite´ en Question, 96 Revue Ge´ne´rale de Droit
International Public (1989), 5, 13–4. On the nuances between the various notions,
see Brian F. Havel, An International Law Institution in Crisis: Rethinking
Permanent Neutrality, 61 Ohio State LJ (2000), 167, 179.
104 Torrelli, above n.103, 14.
105 Michael Bothe, “The Law of Neutrality”, in Dieter Fleck (ed.), The handbook of in-
ternational humanitarian law (2013), 550.
106 Torrelli, above n.103, 14.
107 Natalino Ronzitti, “Italy’s Non-Belligerency during the Iraqi War”, in Maurizio
Ragazzi (eds.), International responsibility today: essays in memory of Oscar
Schachter (2005), 199; Andrea Gioia, Neutrality and Non-Belligerency, in Harry
H.G. Post (ed.), International economic law and armed conﬂict (1994), 79.
108 Gioia, above n.107, 76–80. See also Jessup, Fauchille and de la Pradelle referred to
by Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, “Benevolent” Third States in International
Armed Conﬂicts: The Myth of the Irrelevance of the Law of Neutrality, in Michael
N. Schmitt and Jelena Peijic (eds.), International Law and Armed Conﬂict:
Exploring the Faultlines: Essays in honour of Yoram Dinstein (2007), 544–5. This
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40. Nevertheless, there are convincing arguments to deny the existence of such an
intermediate status. First, apart from two rare references in provisions of international
humanitarian law (IHL),109 no IHL treaty or (more recent) soft-law instrument refers
to “non-belligerency”. Second, besides the ofﬁcial Italian position of non-belligerency
during the Iraq conﬂict in 2003,110 no other State in recent history has tried to justify
violations of neutrality law by reference to such an intermediate status. Lastly, non-
belligerency is only rarely referred to in domestic Military Manuals.111 In its recent
LOAC Manual, the US defends the “qualiﬁed belligerent” theory, but only in case it
is used in support of a victim of aggression, while nevertheless also admitting it is
“controversial”.112 In sum, a status of non-belligerency has not widely been recog-
nized in legal doctrine,113 and ﬁnds only very limited support in State practice. As
one author aptly summed it up: “whenever an IAC breaks out, States are either bellig-
erent or neutral”.114
41. As a result, States adopting a non-belligerent stance still have to take into ac-
count possible115 countermeasures by an aggrieved belligerent, who ﬁnds that the
State has violated its duties under neutrality law.116 For example, during the conﬂict
between Israel and its Arab neighbours in 1973, Arab States imposed an oil embargo
against Western States, because the latter were aiding Israel in its war effort. The
Arab States justiﬁed this embargo by arguing that the targeted Western States
position was also strongly defended by US Attorney General Jackson in 1941, see
ibid., 546.
109 See GC III, art. 4(B)(2) and AP I, art. 2(c).
110 See above n.9.
111 See, for instance, Canada, The Law of Armed Conﬂict at the Operational and
Tactical Levels, Ofﬁce of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, paras.1031
and 1036.
112 US Department of Defence Law of War Manual, June 2015 (updated December
2016), para.15.2.2.
113 Heintschel von Heinegg, above n.108, at 553–4.
114 Sandoz, above n.99, 93. The only possible correct use of the notion of non-
belligerency would therefore refer to a neutral State which can temporarily set aside
its obligations because of obligations imposed by a UNSC resolution.
115 In contrast to neutral States, who have a duty to defend their neutrality in case bel-
ligerents commit neutrality law violations, the opposite scenario (a violation by a
neutral State) does not create a duty for the aggrieved belligerents to respond.
116 Heintschel von Heinegg, above n.108, at 555–6, citing Bring. See also Kevin Jon
Heller, The Law of Neutrality Does Not Apply to the Conﬂict with Al-Qaeda, and
it’s a Good Thing, Too: A Response to Chang, 47 Texas ILJ (2011), 138; Walter L.
Williams Jr., Neutrality in Modern Armed Conﬂicts: A Survey of the Developing
Law, 90 Military LR (1980), 40.
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(in particular the US and the Netherlands)117 violated their neutral duty of
impartiality.118
42. Both in doctrine and practice, uncertainty nevertheless exists with regard to
possible (forcible) countermeasures that can be taken against violations of neutrality
law. In the Charter era, forcible countermeasures may only be taken by way of mea-
sure of self-defence in reaction to an armed attack in accordance with Article 51 UN
Charter. If the violation of neutrality law by the neutral State does not amount to an
armed attack, the aggrieved belligerent cannot react with force. This would lead to
the conclusion that the armed reprisals adopted by Iraq against Kuwait in 2003, in re-
taliation for the latter’s support to the US-led coalition, could at least not be justiﬁed
by reference to violations of the law of neutrality.
43. However, UNSC-imposed obligations, such as an arms embargo, can tempo-
rarily suspend neutral obligations, hence removing the existence of a wrongful act in
the ﬁrst place and thereby excluding any type of countermeasure by the aggrieved bel-
ligerent. Controversy remains as to whether UNSC authorizations lead to the same ef-
fect. For instance, if the Iraq invasion in 2003 would have been authorized by the
UNSC, then granting overﬂight to the US would arguably not have been considered
problematic.119
117 Under Operation “Nickel Grass”, the US airlifted tons of military material to Israel
(see Walter J. Boryne, “Nickel Grass”, 81 Air Force Magazine (1998) (online ar-
chived version: https://web.archive.org/web/20120331195111/http://www.air
force-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1998/December%201998/
1298nickel.aspx)). The Dutch Minister of Defence secretely allowed the US air-
planes to stopover on Dutch territory on their way to Israel. See Duco Hellema,
Cees Wiebes and Gerardus T. Witte, The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis (2004),
33-4.
118 Stephen C. Neff, The Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History (2000),
199.
119 The crux of the question is how one interprets UN Charter Article 103, which says
that “[i]n the event of a conﬂict between the obligations [. . .] under the present
Charter and [. . .] obligations under any other international agreement, [. . .] obliga-
tions under the present Charter shall prevail”. A textual and strict interpretation
would mean that only UNSC-imposed obligations can prevail over neutral duties. A
broader interpretation would also include UNSC authorizations, thus removing the
wrongful character of assistance offered by neutral States to belligerents and thereby
excluding the possibility of countermeasures. The former position is defended by,
inter alia, Jean Combacau, Le pouvoir de sanction de l’ONU: e´tude the´orique de la
coercition non militaire (1974), 284; Rudolf Bernhardt, “Article 103”, in Bruno
Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: a Commentary (2002),
1296; Richard H. Lauwaars, “The Interrelationship between United Nations Law
and the Law of Other International Organizations”, 82 Michigan LR (1984), 1604,
1607. Case-law of both the ECtHR and the ECJ seem to point in that direction as
well: see ECJ, The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com Srl v HM Treasury and Bank of
England, Case No. C-124/95, [1995] ECR I-00081 (ECLI:EU:C:1997:8),
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44. To summarize, providing the type of support as discussed under Section II (ex-
cept for the humanitarian assistance) would clearly violate neutral duties. While some
States explicitly recognized this—and therefore refused to provide such assistance—
others have tried to deny it by wrongfully invoking an intermediate status of non-
belligerency or by claiming that multi- or bilateral agreements between allies would
prevail over neutrality rules—something which has been contested by national
courts.
45. Nevertheless, there are some examples of support in violation of neutrality law
which have remained without consequences, leaving us with inconsistent practice as
regards the application of neutrality law. However, at no point was this prima facie un-
lawful behaviour accompanied by the necessary opinio juris to be able to argue a change
in customary international law. As such, the traditional understanding of the law of
neutrality (inasmuch as it has not been altered by the UN Charter) remains standing.
III.B. The principle of non-intervention
46. Complementary to neutrality law, though not applicable to international armed
conﬂicts, is the principle of non-intervention that has classically been described as
follows:
[I]ntervention is forcible or dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of an-
other state, calculated to impose certain conduct or consequences on that other
state. [. . .] Since every state has the right, as an attribute of its sovereignty and
insofar as it is not qualiﬁed by treaty obligations, to decide for itself such matters
as its political, economic, social and cultural systems, and its foreign policy, in-
terference in those matters can infringe its sovereignty.120
47. In contrast to the law of neutrality, however, the principle of non-intervention is
not enshrined in a specially devoted treaty. Nevertheless, in 1970, the General
para.60; and ECtHR, Al Jedda v. UK, Application No. 27021/08, Judgment, 7
July 2011, para.102. Nevertheless, a broader interpretation can be found in more re-
cent soft law instruments on neutrality (see Tallinn Manual, rule 85 and AMW
Manual, art. 165), and seems to be widely defended (at least implicitly) in doctrine
(inter alia by Bothe, above n.105, 553; Daniel Thu¨rer, Comment: UN
Enforcement Measures and Neutrality. The Case of Switzerland, 30 Archiv Des
Vo¨lkerrechts (1992), 63, 81; Paul Seger, “The Law of Neutrality”, Andrew
Clapham and Paola Gaeta (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Law in
Armed Conﬂict (2014), 262). Milanovic notes, however, that such interpretation is
based “on policy grounds and without much textual support in the Charter”. See
Marko Milanovic, Norm conﬂict in international law: whither human rights?, 20
Duke JCIL (2009), 69, 78.
120 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds.), 1 Oppenheim’s International Law
(2008), para.129 (footnotes omitted).
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Assembly adopted the Friendly Relations Declaration, wherein the same principle
was considered to prescribe that,
[n]o State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type
of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination
of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any
kind.121
48. Finally, the ICJ dubbed the principle “part and parcel of customary international
law”122 and clariﬁed that
the principle forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or indi-
rectly in internal or external affairs of other States. A prohibited intervention
must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted,
by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice
of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of for-
eign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard
to such choices, which must remain free ones.123
Two conditions thus need to be met for a violation of the non-intervention principle:
State action must constitute coercive interference in another State’s domaine re´serve´.
49. Consequently, it is, ﬁrst, submitted that the principle of non-intervention in se
does not frustrate a government-in-distress from soliciting (military) support from an
allied government in quelling a NIAC. The norm embodies the “right of every sover-
eign State to conduct its affairs without outside interference” and qualiﬁes as the
“corollary of the principle of sovereign equality of States”.124 As the right is borne by
the State, represented by its internationally recognized government, it logically
cannot qualify as a legal impediment to foreign assistance if so requested by that
government.125 It is indeed difﬁcult to see how such assistance could be described as
121 Friendly Relations Declaration, above n.2, 123. See also: AP II, art. 3(2).
122 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, at
para.202.
123 Ibid., at para.205.
124 Ibid., at para.202 (emphasis added). See also the principle of sovereign equality of
States in the Friendly Relations Declaration, above n.2, 124.
125 Hafner noted in this context that “intervention and military assistance with prior
consent are diametrically opposed concepts so that the one cannot be a legal limita-
tion to the other”: Gerhard Hafner, Present Problems of the Use of Force in
International Law; Sub-group: Intervention by Invitation, Institut de Droit
International Tenth Commission, Naples Session (2009), 409. But, see also: Louise
Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the
Government, 56 BYIL 189 (1985), 250; The´odore Christakis and Karine
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coercive towards the requesting State, or intended to subordinate the exercise of that
State’s sovereign rights.126 The better view seems to be that the right to self-
determination is the appropriate legal norm for this purpose as it ensures the right of
all peoples (as opposed to a State) to determine, without external interference, their
political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
However, given the focus of this article, that line of thought will not be further devel-
oped here.
50. Secondly, the principle clearly does forbid States to “organize, assist, foment, ﬁ-
nance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the vi-
olent overthrow of the regime of another State”.127 The ICJ similarly determined that “if
one State, with a view to the coercion of another State, supports and assists armed
bands in that State whose purpose is to overthrow the government of that State, that
amounts to an intervention by the one State in the internal affairs of the other”.128
More speciﬁcally, the Court stipulated that “assistance to rebels in the form of the
provision of weapons or logistical or other support [. . .] may be regarded as a threat
or use of force, or amount to intervention in the internal or external affairs of other
States”.129
51. Mention should also be made of the Wiesbaden Resolution on “The Principle
of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars”, adopted in 1975 by the Institut de Droit
International (Institut).130 Although the resolution can probably not be considered as
the codiﬁcation of customary international law in its entirety,131 it was clear that all
members of the Institut agreed on the existence of a general prohibition for States to
support insurgents abroad.132 Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, this is still
Bannelier, Volenti Non Fit Injuria? Les Effets du Consentement a` l’Intervention
Militaire, 50 AFDI (2004), 102, 113-20.
126 Maziar Jamnejad and Michael Wood, The Principle of Non-intervention, 22
Leiden JIL (2009), 345, 378.
127 Friendly Relations Declaration, above n.2, 123 (emphasis added).
128 ICJ Nicaragua case, above n.122, para.241 (emphasis added).
129 Ibid., para.195. See also: Ibid., para.228: “while the arming and training of the con-
tras can certainly be said to involve the threat or use of force against Nicaragua [. . .]
the Court considers that the mere supply of funds to the contras, while undoubtedly
an act of intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua, [. . .] does not in itself
amount to a use of force”.
130 Resolution on the Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars, Institut de Droit
International Eight Commission, Wiesbaden Session (1975) (www.idi-iil.org/app/
uploads/2017/06/1975_wies_03_en.pdf).
131 Dietrich Schindler, Le Principe de Non-intervention dans les Guerres Civiles, 56
AIDI (1975), 119, 127 and 411-74.
132 Ibid., 127.
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supported by the opinio juris of States.133 An explicit example thereof can be found in
the 2016 US Law of War Manual.134
52. It is, therefore, somewhat surprising that the previous section describing mod-
ern State practice seems to capture a more pragmatic trend in international relations
whereby third-state support to rebel groups, ﬁghting the government-in-power, is not
considered unlawful as long as it serves humanitarian or non-military purposes only.
As such, it diverges from the Nicaragua acquis which prohibits even humanitarian as-
sistance which is not “given without discrimination to all in need”.135 Generally,
however, the trend seems to correspond to the Wiesbaden Resolution, which prohib-
its pro-rebel forcible (e.g., through armed forces or the supply of war material) and
dictatorial interference (e.g., through ﬁnancial, economic or technical support which
is likely to inﬂuence or have a substantial impact on the outcome of the armed
conﬂict).136
53. However, with regard to military support, it is equally clear that the sponsoring
States showed an absolute unwillingness to accept responsibility for their actions,137
except when it was aimed at ﬁghting a group that is internationally branded as a ter-
rorist organization.138 This also matches with the classical understanding of the non-
intervention principle, given that it solely proscribes support aimed at the violent
overthrow of the internationally recognized government. As a consequence, the prac-
tice can have no bearing on the traditional interpretation of the non-intervention
principle, as prima facie violations without accompanying opinio juris leave intact the
prohibition on assisting rebel armed forces through military means.139
133 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (2008), 68. See also:
Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (2008), 1152.
134 US Law of War Manual, above n.112, para.17.18.1.
135 ICJ Nicaragua case, above n.122, para.243. If correct, this aspect of the non-
intervention principle is contrary to the rule under neutrality law, which clearly
allows for humanitarian aid to parties to an international armed conﬂict (see for in-
stance HC V, art. 14).
136 See Wiesbaden Resolution, above n.130, arts. 2-4.
137 See, above Sections II.C. and II.D.
138 See, above n.37. See also: SC Res 2249 (2015), 1.
139 See, from a methodological perspective: Olivier Corten, The Law Against War
(2012), 30. Whether or not an exception exists under the same principle regarding
similar support for anti-terrorist purposes is a matter currently under dispute, but
outside the scope of this article. See Christakis and Bannelier, above n.125, 126;
Raphael Van Steenberghe, The Alleged Prohibition on Intervening in Civil Wars Is
Still Alive after the Airstrikes against Islamic State in Iraq: A Response to Dapo
Akande and Zachary Vermeer, EJIL: Talk! (2015), 12 February 2015 (www.ejiltal-
k.org/the-alleged-prohibition-on-intervening-in-civil-wars-is-still-alive-after-the-air-
strikes-against-islamic-state-in-iraq-a-response-to-dapo-akande-and-zachary-ver-
meer/). Even so, a State defending its conduct by appealing to possible exceptions or
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54. In sum, the combination of (1) the refusal by US ofﬁcials to specify the types
of lethal support and their broad reliance upon “covert action authority”, (2) the eva-
sive reaction or outright denial of any Russian involvement in supporting the rebels
in southeastern Ukraine, (3) the absence of overt State practice by European States,
(4) the general emphasis placed on the ﬁght against the terrorist organization “Islamic
State”, and (5) the negative opinio juris expressed by a myriad of States therefore per-
suasively argues against the non-intervention principle having fallen into desuetude in
this context.
IV. Towards a harmonized “duty of neutrality” during IACs
and NIACs?
55. The foregoing sections suggest a remarkable complementarity between both mod-
ern practice by third States in their support to belligerent parties in IACs and rebel
armed forces in NIACs (or refusal thereof) as well as the relevant legal frameworks.
This inevitably begs the question whether taking a holistic approach might provide
innovative insights and, perhaps, support some of the trends described and arguments
made above.
IV.A. Optional or mandatory?
56. As outlined in section III, some authors still claim that neutrality law is merely
optional. It is submitted, however, that neutrality law is automatically triggered when
an IAC erupts, leaving no room for a general intermediate legal category of non-
belligerency. This is in line with the principle of non-intervention, of which the legal
consequences apply regardless of States deciding to “opt in”. A preliminary, but cru-
cial, determination is thus that States have no (lawful) way of shirking international
legal obligations related to neutrality—regardless of the type of armed conﬂict.
IV.B. Non-participation in hostilities
57. With regard to the duty of non-participation in hostilities, the law of neutrality
unequivocally prohibits third States from sending their armed forces (including mili-
tary advisers) to intervene militarily in an IAC, if they want to preserve their neutral
status (and enjoy the correlating rights involved). This approach is equally uncon-
tested in NIACs, since the non-intervention principle stipulates that armed interven-
tion against the personality of the State is a violation of international law. It is
justiﬁcations “contained within the rule itself” actually reinforces rather than weak-
ens that rule. ICJ Nicaragua case, above n.122, para.186. See also: Michael Wood,
International Law Commission, Second Report on Identiﬁcation of International
Law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/672, 22 May 2014, para.78.
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submitted that a conceptually sound approach to the term “intervention” in the latter
case solely covers military intervention on the side of rebel forces, as military assis-
tance upon request of the government would not constitute a breach of State sover-
eignty.140 Again, neutrality law and the principle of non-intervention therefore
outlaw similar behaviour.
IV.C. War(-related) material
58. During an IAC, a neutral State is not allowed to provide military assistance to the
belligerent parties. Indeed, neutrality law prescribes a negative equality approach, out-
lawing not only war-related assistance to one of the parties, but even the provision of
similar assistance to all warring parties in an IAC.141 Doctrine conﬁrms the prohibi-
tion of assistance that “could inﬂuence the outcome of the [IAC]”.142 Looking at the
provision of equipment more speciﬁcally, Article 6 HC XIII clearly states that “the
supply, in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral Power to a belligerent
Power, of war-ships, ammunition, or war material of any kind whatever, is
forbidden”.143
59. The notion of “war material” is, unfortunately, not further deﬁned by neutral-
ity law. Bothe interprets it in a very strict way, by arguing that solely the supply of
weapons stricto sensu is banned, i.e. “material that is capable of being used for killing
enemy soldiers or destroying enemy goods”.144 This might be a bit of a stretch.
Classical doctrine, for example, argues more broadly that “material which has, exclu-
sively (or at least mainly), a military purpose is prohibited”, a statement which is simi-
larly conﬁrmed by domestic military manuals.145 Nevertheless, both the law and the
practice of neutral States as discussed under Section 1 only conﬁrms a clear exception
140 But, see the reference to self-determination in Section III.B.
141 This can be derived inter alia from HC V, art. 6 and HC XIII, art. 9.
142 In a similar vein, Heintschel von Heinegg writes that neutral States “are prohibited
from assisting one party in a manner that could lead to a temporal, spatial or other
widening of the conﬂict.” See Heintschel von Heinegg, above n.108, 565.
143 Emphasis added.
144 Bothe, above n.2, para.42.
145 Castre´n, above n.101. See also: Lauterpacht, above n.100. See also, for instance, the
German Military Manual, which states in para.1207 that “a neutral state may not
support any of the parties to the conﬂict. Prohibited is for instance: the supply of war
ships, munitions and other war material [. . .] allowing military transit through the
neutral state’s land, water or airspace [. . .] even though exceptions exist for the tran-
sit of wounded and sick [and] allowing the establishment of military bases or supply
and telecommunication facilities” (authors’ translation, emphasis added), see
Germany, ZDv15/2, Humanita¨risch Vo¨lkerrecht in bewaffneten Konﬂikten,
Handbuch, 2013, DSK AV230100262, 166. Similarly, see the US Law of War
Manual, above n.112, para.15.3.2.1.
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for humanitarian assistance, while leaving in the middle whether the supply of mate-
rial or providing assistance that is linked to the conﬂict but does not have a main or
direct military purpose146 would be lawful or not.
60. If such support would be allowed by neutrality law, this would correspond to
the recent trend in State practice during NIACs, which supports the proposition that
providing assistance to rebel ﬁghters, which is non-lethal and does not have a direct
link to the armed conﬂict, does not violate a State’s duty not to intervene in other
States’ domestic affairs. This trend conﬁrms the Wiesbaden acquis, in that it suggests
a ban on third-state assistance which either serves a (direct) military purpose or could
likely inﬂuence (or have a substantial impact on) the outcome of the armed
conﬂict.147
61. In other words, the “duty of neutrality”, applicable to all armed conﬂicts, cer-
tainly proscribes assistance to the belligerent parties that has a direct and effective im-
pact on their war-waging ability (including the supply of both lethal and non-lethal
military material, i.e., any type of armament and ammunition, but also armoured
vehicles, body armour and military intelligence for example), whereas it also clearly
allows for humanitarian assistance.
62. Somewhat less clear is whether the same harmony between neutrality law and
the principle of non-intervention exists when it comes to assistance which is neither
military nor lethal, but nevertheless does not qualify as purely humanitarian aid.148
However, since recent practice in NIACs seems to suggest such (pro-rebel) assistance
is allowed under the principle of non-intervention and the law of neutrality (as inter-
preted by States and legal scholars alike) is inconclusive, arguably both legal frame-
works should share the same threshold of legality: unless the provided support could
likely inﬂuence the outcome of the armed conﬂict, there is no prohibition against
providing it to a party engaged in either an international or non-international armed
conﬂict.
IV.D. Economic coercion
63. Article 9 HC V (embodying the duty of impartiality as part of neutrality law) pre-
scribes that “[e]very measure of restriction or prohibition taken by a neutral Power
[. . .] must be impartially applied by it to both belligerents”. This is thought to imply
that “[a] change in commercial relationships favouring one of the belligerents
would [. . .] constitute taking sides in a manner incompatible with the status of
146 For examples of this type of support, see above nn.43, 54 and 61.
147 Wiesbaden Resolution, above n.130, art. 2(2)(c) and (d) and art. 3(b).
148 This includes certain types of equipment, training programs, and assistance that ex-
clusively serves protective purposes. See, for example, above nn.43, 54 and 61.
Ferro and Verlinden, Neutrality During Armed Conﬂicts 41
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/chinesejil/article-abstract/17/1/15/4990421
by Columbia University user
on 30 April 2018
neutrality”.149 From the duty of impartiality, it logically follows that applying the
same measure to all belligerent parties is nonetheless prohibited if its impact is differ-
entiated and thereby has a likely effect on the outcome of the armed conﬂict: similar
cases must not be treated differently, but different cases must not be treated similarly.
64. Conversely, in the context of the Nicaragua case, the ICJ determined (in one
sentence) that the serious economic measures taken by the US administration to the
detriment of the Nicaraguan government—which was argued by the latter to be an
“‘indirect’ form of intervention”150—could not be regarded as a violation of the prin-
ciple of non-intervention.151 However, the type of measures adopted in that case ar-
guably qualify as “the most common, and potentially most severe, economic actions
that can be employed against a state”.152 Indeed, both the element of coercion inher-
ent in the non-intervention principle and a comparison to the law of neutrality in
similar circumstances, argue against the approach taken by the ICJ.
65. It is thus submitted that a third State should be prohibited from adopting eco-
nomic coercive measures intended to signiﬁcantly weaken a sitting government
embroiled in a NIAC, or against only one of the belligerents in an IAC.
IV.E. Overview
66. Neutrality law and the principle of non-intervention thus (1) apply automatically
during IACs and NIACs (though the principle of non-intervention obviously applies
outside of armed conﬂict as well); (2) proscribe intervention through the use of their
military forces in support of any of the belligerent parties in an IAC and the rebel
forces in case of a NIAC; (3) prohibit the provision of assistance that has an effective
impact on the war-waging capabilities of belligerents, and, ﬁnally; (4) do not allow
the adoption of economic coercive measures to signiﬁcantly weaken (one of) the gov-
ernment(s) embroiled in armed conﬂict.
V. Conclusion
67. A conceptually sound view on the law of neutrality and the principle of non-
intervention leads to the conclusion that third States are prohibited from supporting
any belligerent during an IAC (unless the third States choose to become belligerents
themselves) or any non-state actor embroiled in a NIAC with the internationally rec-
ognized government. Taken together, international law has thus to a certain extent
taken away individual States’ right to inﬂuence the outcome of armed conﬂict and,
149 Bothe, above n.144, para.4.
150 ICJ Nicaragua case, above n.122, para.244.
151 Ibid., para.245.
152 Jamnejad and Wood, above n.126, 370.
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instead, squarely placed the obligation to ensure international peace and security with
the international community of States, represented by the United Nations. It is the
UNSC that bears the greatest responsibility in this respect, as it is provided with near-
limitless powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to curb armed violence.
68. However, theory only gets us so far. The events of the past decades and the
ubiquity of armed conﬂicts today have shown, ﬁrst, that States do wish to inﬂuence
the outcome of conﬂicts and, second, that the UNSC more often than not refuses to
take decisive action when faced with a conﬂict situation. As a result, States have
sought for creative (but not always accepted) interpretations of international law that
would justify their behaviour, by claiming for instance that they could be “non-bellig-
erent”—rather than neutral—in international conﬂicts, or that providing protective
equipment or support which would greatly save civilian lives would not fall within
the scope of the non-intervention principle. While a gap between doctrine and prac-
tice is thus apparent, the way forward is much less so.
69. In this regard, we want to stress two points. First, neutrality law and the non-
intervention principle seem to work in a complementary fashion and, though some
differences undoubtedly remain, share a common core and purpose. It is a good ex-
ample of the coherence, rather than fragmentation of international law. Second, there
is no evidence that State practice and opinio juris, properly understood and analysed,
have come so far as to change these fundamental doctrines.
70. Additional attention and research should nonetheless be devoted to an even
more comprehensive comparison between neutrality law and the principle of non-
intervention, since certain elements have not been touched upon (in any depth), e.g.,
assessing the possible due diligence obligation for third-states to impede the recruit-
ment of rebel forces on their territory as well as the potential duty for such States to
capture and intern rebel forces if found on their territory. In addition, it would be
useful to monitor any future State practice which could further delineate the distinc-
tion between lawful humanitarian support and unlawful military support, and the
grey zone in between.
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